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I.

This Court Should Correct the Error of the Court of
Appeals in Overlooking Utah Code Ann. § 59-1302(7) (b) (2000) Finding Reckless Disregard by
Stevenson.

The Utah Legislature obviously utilized the framework of
federal case law in drafting Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(2000) in
addressing and framing its definition of "willfulness."' To
characterize the Appellant's position as "discrediting federal
law" is inaccurate.

But the Utah statute should be correctly

applied and interpreted.
This Court is capable of weighing the literal language of
the State's statute and determining the legislative intent
therein.

Additionally, though the Appellee's Brief alleges

there is uniformity in the federal court cases, modifications on
the definition of "willfulness" and its varied application to
particular cases illustrates that uniformity is an illusory term.
(See Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-15.)
The knowledge Stevenson had of noncompliance in Tower's
filing returns, in signing checks to pay withholding tax, and in
awareness of the history of Kenneth Steckelberg's prior
mismanagement, meet the threshold of statutory reckless disregard
of obvious (or known) risks contained in Utah Code Ann. § 59-1302(7) (b) (2000) .
The crux of Appellant's argument regarding use of the Utah
statute, is that the first level of review by this Court is the
language of the statute.

The Utah language does not mirror the
1

federal statute.

That may be significant.

did not think it was.

The Court of Appeals

The Commission focused on the state

statute, but does not have the authority to create legal
precedent.

This Court does, and should direct the future

interpretation and application in administrative actions and
cases.

Appellant thinks the record establishes the criteria for

a prima

facie

II.

case and encourages this Court to agree.

The Court of Appeals Incorrectly Applied the Principle
of Preferring Other Creditors over the State
Government, Due to Stevenson's Control of Funds.

Even if this Court adopts the application of federal cases
in defining willfulness under the Utah statute, the facts here
still favor Stevenson's liability.

A crucial issue in Finley v.

United States, 123 F.3d 1342, (10th Cir. 1997) and other cases
cited by Appellee, is the extent of control demonstrated or
exercised over funds by the responsible person.
A close examination of the principles reflected in In re:
Premo, 116 B.R. 515, 535 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Mich., 1990) shows how the
facts of that case differ from Stevenson.

The facts in Premo

note that "the Debtor testified that the funds used to pay
employees came directly from [Michigan National Bank] MNB, and
were forwarded to Tri-Cities for the specific purpose of paying
payroll."

(id. at 536.)

The court continued to clarify when

funds can be considered encumbered for purposes of excusing an
otherwise responsible person from the obligation of willfully
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failing to withhold and remit to the government.

The court

stated "In determining whether funds are encumbered, the cases
have focused on the extent to which the employer has unimpaired
access to or control of the funds."

(id. at 536.)

In that case,

the Debtor, Michael J. Premo, had no prior training or experience
in finance, and for a newly formed corporation, Tri-Cities
Computer Mart, Inc., it hired an individual as CFO.

The CFO was

the person with the responsibility and control of the financial
operation of the corporation.

After four years passed, the

Debtor only became aware of financial troubles through direct
notice by MNB.

In further defining the concept of "encumbrance,"

the Court continued, "As previously stated, the fact that funds
are subject to a security interest does not itself warrant a
finding that the funds are 'encumbered.'

The IRS is therefore

correct in stating '[t]he mere existence of a security interest
in favor of one creditor cannot be held to given a responsible
person the blanket license to prefer all types of other creditors
over the United States.'" (Xd. at 536.)

Then that court excuses

the Debtor since MNB only permitted the funds it supplied to be
used for current payroll purposes and payment of minimal
operating expenses such as rent and utilities.

MNB did not

permit any of the funds to be applied toward delinquent
withholding taxes.

The creditor in Premo had much greater

control over the use of funds than the Bank of Utah did in this

3

case.
Stevenson had prior involvement as the sole check signer for
Tower.

Stevenson had also signed returns for the second and

fourth quarter of 1999.

In November of 2000, Stevenson became

fully aware of the financial condition, but certainly
historically had greater involvement than the Debtor did in
Premo. (See Statement of Facts in Brief of Appellant, pp. 4-7.)
The actions of Stevenson demonstrated that he, not the Bank
of Utah, was in control as to what creditors were paid.

On

November 15, 2001, Stevenson completed the orchestration of
obtaining payment from XO Communications.
Brief, Addendum D.)

(See Appellant's

After Stevenson paid personal funds to

acquire the assignment from subcontractors (funds which were
totally unencumbered), Stevenson acted as a signer for Tower and
personally, in concert with Brett Cherry, in the contract to
obtain the specific account receivable for XO Communications and
then directed that the check from XO Communications be directly
paid to the Bank of Utah.

(See Appellant's Brief, Statement of

Facts, pp. 7-8.)
A.

Stevenson's Self-interest in Actions Taken after
November 2000, Demonstrate Use of Personal Assets
for Corporate Purpose.

Since Stevenson had competing responsibilities as an officer
of the Bank of Utah, and an officer of Tower, the specter of
self-serving interest in seeing to it that the Bank of Utah was
4

paid before or instead of other creditors, taints the
characterization of his actions as a simple response to a secured
creditor.
The trust fund nature of withholding tax was raised in the
formal hearing before the Administrative Law Judge.
234.)

(Tr. at 232,

Further, until the decision of the Court of Appeals, the

issue of encumbered priority among secured creditors was not in
issue.

Since it is arguable that the secured interest of the Tax

Commission is at least on equivalent footing with the interest of
the Bank of Utah, it further differentiates the Stevenson case
from Premo, and like cases raised in Appellee's Brief.
Appellee argues that the Administrative Law Judge needed to
make a specific finding in the Commission's order, that it must
constitute a preference for those creditors over the Tax
Commission.

(Appellee's Brief at 18-19.)

If that was an

oversight, this Court can correct that oversight by making a
determination on the record that the payment did constitute
commitment of personal funds for corporate purposes, "priming the
pump" to allow the collection of an outstanding account
receivable from XO Communications.

Without that priming, no

collection of funds would have occurred, and Stevenson risked
both the attempt to collect for Tower, and risked his standing
with the Bank of Utah.
Appellee discounts the use of the lien statute, Utah Code
5

Ann. § 59-10-406(6) due to an unfiled warrant and a reference to
Phillips Petroleum v. Waastaff. 450 P.2d 100 (Utah 1969).

The

Phillips court was distinguishing cases on the notice to the
secured creditor of the tax amount due and delinquent.
filed would give that notice.

A warrant

Here, a warrant could not be filed

because Stevenson's filing a Petition for Redetermination stayed
further collection action by the Commission, including filing
warrant.

No warrant will be filed until final disposition, and

only if that favors the Commission.

But Tower and Stevenson had

actual notice of the assessment and the amount, and the statute
creates in them constructive of lien also.
III. The Supreme Court Should Weigh Both the Facts and the
Law in the Record to Determine if the Court of Appeals
Applied the Standard of Review Correctly.
This Court has weighed issues of fact and law multiple times
in prior decisions.

The Appellant does not presume that mixed

questions off fact and law are easy to determine.
specific statutory requirement of a prima

facie

established by Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7) (b) .

However, the

case is
The facts

presented at the formal hearing are summarized in the record and
the decision of the Tax Commission.

The standard of review, as

articulated in Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(2000), is also clear.
The Appellant has confidence that this Court will determine those
matters of fact and issues of law and allow the deference to the
Commission to which it is entitled.
6

CONCLUSION
In light of the need to establish local precedent with
regard to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302, and the particular facts and
legal issues raised in relation to Stevenson, his position with
both Tower and the Bank of Utah, Appellant requests that the
Court affirms the decision of the Tax Commission and overrules
and clarifies the decision of the Court of Appeals.
DATED this /J)

"day of December, 2005.

GALE KVFRANCIS^
Assistant Attorney General
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